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REVIEW ESSAY

The Place of Law and Literature
By Robert A. Ferguson.
Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Pp. 417. $22.50.
LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE.

THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE LAWYER AS PROTAGONIST IN MOD-

By Richard H. Weisberg. New Haven, Conn. and
London: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xvi, 218. $19.50.

ERN FICTION.

WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTIOF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY. By James
Boyd White. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1984. Pp. xvi, 377. $25.00.
TUTIONS

Reviewed by William H. Page*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The modern field of law and literature began in 1907 with the
publication of Wigmore's list of novels related to law.' The form of
that work is significant because for decades, the field remained
largely one of reading lists assembled to broaden the perspectives
of practicing lawyers.2 In literary scholarship, law and literature
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A. 1973, Tulane University;
J.D. 1975, University of New Mexico; LL.M. 1979, The University of Chicago. I would like
to thank, with the usual absolutions, Milner Ball, Craig Callen, Judith W. Page, J. Allen
Smith, Aviam Soifer, and Clayton P. Gillette for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Wigmore, A List of Legal Novels, 2 ILL. L. REv. 574 (1908); see Papke, Law and
Literature:A Comment and Bibliography of Secondary Works, 73 L. Lmsa J. 421 (1980); see
also Suretsky, Search for a Theory: An Annotated Bibliography of Writings on the Relations of Law to Literatureand the Humanities, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 727 (1980).
2. Suretsky, supra note 1, contains a chronological bibliography. The reading lists'
function of broadening the perspectives of practicing lawyers should not be minimized. A
modern, sophisticated application of the reading list is "Doing Justice: Literary Texts, Professional Values, and the Judicial System," a judicial-education program of the Massachusetts Foundation for Humanities and Public Policy.
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scarcely could have been called a field; critics discussed the effects
of law on the work of various writers, often perceptively s but their
studies were independent of each other and of legal scholarship. In
the past decade, however, law and literature has shed its nonprofessional heritage and has emerged as a truly interdisciplinary field
of study4 with such trappings as scholarly conferences, 5 symposia
in law journals, 6 law school courses, and permanent organizations.7
The influence of hermeneutics is such that "the footnotes in the
kind of constitutional law articles that used to cite Rawls and
Nozick now increasingly refer to works of literary theory."' Despite
these outward manifestations of maturity, the subject matter of
law and literature remains poorly defined even in the minds of
those lawyers and literary scholars who recognize it as a field.9
This lack of clear identity is not a problem in more established
interdisciplinary fields. For example, the subject matter of law and
economics, a field that has been rigorously academic from its inception," is nothing if not well defined. 1 Law and economics is not
simply the application of economic techniques to legal problems;
the approach carries with it a set of concerns, a theory of value, a
conception of human behavior, and a view of the role of the state,
all of which have important jurisprudential consequences.12 An interdisciplinary field has reached maturity when its techniques have
3. Papke, supra note 1, contains a bibliography of criticism arranged according to the
novelist or dramatist discussed.
4. This metamorphosis of law and literature was heralded in two works by J. Allen
Smith. Smith, The Coming Renaissance in Law and Literature, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13
(1979); Smith, Aspects of Law and Literature:The Revival and Search for Doctrine, 9 U.
HARTFORD STUD. IN LITERATURE

213 (1977), see also Reich, Toward the HumanisticStudy of

Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965).
5. Major conferences on law and literature in recent years have included The Law and
Southern Literature, 4 Miss. CL. REV. - (1984) (Jackson, Miss., Oct. 21-22, 1983); Terror in the Modern Age: The Vision of Literature, The Response of Law, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. No.
2 (1983) (Waltham, Mass., May 1-2, 1982); and A Moral Critique of Law: The Example of
Melville, (Princeton, N. J., June 20-21, 1980).
6. See, e.g., Symposium, Law and Literature,60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982); Symposium:
Law and Literature, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 603 (1979).
7. These permanent organizations include the Law and Humanities Institute and the
Law and Humanities Section of the Association of American Law Schools.
8. Grey, The Constitutionas Scripture, 37 STAN.L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).
9. See Suretsky, supra note 1, at 730.
10. See Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago,
1932-70, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 163 (1983).
11. Unlike other fields, law and economics boasts several first-rate journals. The subject matter of the field can be gleaned from the editorial policies of The Journalof Law and
Economics and the Journal of Legal Studies.
12. See Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980).

1986]

LAW AND LITERATURE

produced a substantive content that can be examined critically.
Any field must overcome an inherent ambiguity if the simple
conjunction of "law and" is used to designate the field. In law and
literature, for example, the subject matter of the field sometimes is
divided between the law in literature and the law as literature.' 3
The law in literature encompasses the analysis of depictions of legal topics-lawyers, trials, the effects of legal doctrines, and so
forth-in literature. This area is necessarily circumscribed by the
canon of so-called legal novels or drama, however broadly defined. 14 The law as literature is much more difficult to define. At
one level, it involves reclaiming from the vast body of legal documents-constitutions, arguments, opinions-works of literary
merit, and studying them for their aesthetic qualities. 1 5 At another
level, it involves the application of the techniques of literary criticism to legal texts.
Some of the work in law and literature does not fit neatly into
this conventional dichotomy. One major conference, for example,
compared literary and legal responses to a social question as a way
to broaden the perspectives of both fields.'" Other work examines
the transferability of skills from literary to legal study. The field
may also include literature in the law-for example, the area of
censorship.
The breadth of this catalog of concerns is an obstacle to developing an account of the relationship between law and literature.
Some materials suggest that the relationship between law and
literature is one of perpetual antagonism-the writer is an outcast
hurling literary barbs at the legal establishment. The historical
separation of professional study of the two fields lends credence to
this view. Yet, the common concerns of law and literature with the
medium of language and with human relations suggest an actual or
potential harmony. The remarkable publication within the past
year of three major synthesizing works,' 7 in a field strangely lack13.

THE LAW IN LITERATURE

and

THE LAW AS LITERATURE

are the titles of the two

volumes of Ephraim London's anthology THE WORLD OF LAW (1960). The distinction is used

analytically in Weisberg & Barricelli, Literature and Law, in INTERRELATIONS

OF LITERATURE

(J. Barricelli & J. Gibaldi eds. 1982).
14. See Weisberg & Kretschman, Wigmore's "Legal Novels" Expanded: A Collaborative Effort, 7 MD. L. FORUM 94 (1977); Wigmore, supra note 1; Wigmore, One Hundred
Legal Novels, 17 ILL. L. REV. 26 (1922).
15. See, e.g., Weisberg & Barricelli, supra note 13, at 161-74.
16. See Terror in the Modern Age: The Vision of Literature, The Response of Law,
supra note 5.
17. R. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETrERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984); R. WEISBERG, THE
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ing in book-length studies,' offers an occasion for considering this
central issue.
The authors of all three of these books are lawyers with professional degrees in literature. Richard Weisberg and James Boyd
White are law professors who have dominated the field of law and
literature in recent years: White as the author of The Legal Imagination and a leading theorist of interpretation; 19 Weisberg as a
founder of the Law and Humanities Institute and author of articles on the depiction of legal topics in the modern novel.20 Robert
Ferguson, in contrast, is an English professor who has not been
deeply associated with law and literature. Yet Ferguson's work
provides the historical and literary starting point for a unified conception of the field.
Law and Letters in American Culture looks back to a time in
American history, between 1765 and 1840, when law and literature
were fused both professionally and intellectually. Joseph Story in
1829 expressed the era's dominant view when he stated that the
study of law required "a full possession of the general literature of
ancient and modern times."'" Most prominent writers and critics
were lawyers who viewed the law as their primary occupation; the
professional writer or scholar was virtually unknown. At the same
time, most lawyers, at least among the elite of the bar, were well
educated in literature, especially in the Greek and Roman classics.
Lawyers viewed a knowledge of these literary works as a professional necessity in an era in which oratorical eloquence and reference to universal principles were keys to success in the courtroom.
This professional fusion of the disciplines carried with it an intellectual interdependence as well. The lawyer-writers of the time
could not separate their professional training from their literary
aspirations. Yet by the Civil War, the professional and intellectual
interdependence of law and literature had dissolved. 2 The concerns of legal study became progessively more technical and indifFAILURE OF THE WORD: THE LAWYER AS PROTAGONIST IN MODERN FICTION
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING:
CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY

(1984); J.

WHITE,

CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,

(1984).

18. Notable exceptions are C. LANSBURY, THE REASONABLE MAN: TROLLOPE'S LEGAL
FICTION (1981) and M. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW (1981).
19. See, e.g., White, Law as Language:Reading Law and Reading Literature,60 TEx.
L. REV. 415 (1982).

20.
with an
21.
22.

See, e.g., How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor
Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1982).
Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in R FERGUSON, supra note 17, epigraph.
Id. at 199-206.
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ferent to literature, while the concerns of literature became more
individualistic and hostile to the operation of positive law. Ferguson's book concludes with an account of the causes of this rift.
The historical rift formed the basis for the modern relationship between law and literature. Both Weisberg's book and White's
book are responses to the rift, even though neither work refers to
Ferguson's book or to each other. Weisberg's Failure of the Word
pursues the implications of the rift across modern world literature.
His treatment of the almost universal depiction of lawyers as using
the language of the law to gain power over less articulate but more
complete characters sheds light on the modern antagonism between law and literature. In contrast, White's When Words Lose
Their Meaning attempts to reestablish a fusion of law and literature based on a knowledge of classical and world literature and on
a sophisticated conception of the nature of language.
In this Review Essay, I will examine Ferguson's account of the
lost configuration of law and literature and the differing responses
of Weisberg and White to the continuing rift between law and
literature. These three books when read together reveal not only
the breadth of the field of law and literature but also the fundamental unity of the field's concerns. With the insights of these excellent new studies in view, we can begin to define the subject matter of the field.
II. FERGUSON: THE LOST CONFIGURATION
Ferguson's goals in Law and Letters in American Culture are

many, but among the most important is the definition of a previously unrecognized period in American literature between the
Great Awakening and the American Renaissance. This period,
viewed by most readers as a wasteland interrupted by a handful of
works of minor interest, emerges in Ferguson's analysis as a fertile
era whose canon2 - is defined by "the configuration of law and literature.

'2 4

This configuration is an extraordinarily complex intellec-

tual union that dictated both a literary dependence on law and a
legal dependence on literature. In Ferguson's hands, however, the
configuration has remarkable descriptive and analytical power.
Ferguson's description of the configuration shows that works
thought to be purely legal are properly understood as part of gen23. The formation of literary canons is exhaustively explored in CANONS (R. von
Hallberg ed. 1983).
24. R. FERGUSON, supra note 17, at 8-10.
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eral literature and that works of fiction, drama, and poetry were
strongly influenced by the law.
The configuration of law and literature was related to the wellknown Enlightenment faith in the unity of all knowledge. 25 Ferguson, however, has not highlighted artificially one aspect of that
faith. The configuration he describes is unique in its practical economic basis and its profound aesthetic effect on the principal literary works of the period.
By building on the earlier work of Perry Miller, 2 Ferguson
demonstrates that law and the legal profession were at the intellectual and political heart of post-revolutionary America. Although
the colonial view was distinctly antilawyer, the needs of the new
republic to establish its legitimacy and to impose order on its vast
holdings dictated a reliance on law. Lawyers who took control of
the revolutionary effort sought to justify rebellion by reference to
inalienable rights deriving from natural law as expressed from time
immemorial in the common law of England. Blackstone's great
synthesis of English law supplied the needed connection between
natural and positive law, allowing lawyers such as Jefferson and
Paine to rely on these great generalities to urge and justify
7
rebellion.1
American lawyers exploited their pivotal role in the revolutionary effort to control the agenda of intellectual debate in the
early republic; lawyers became the cultural guardians of the era
because of the reliance the precariously situated republic placed on
law.28 Lawyers displaced the clergy as leaders by connecting religion and tyranny and by urging the necessity of separation of
church and state. Later, lawyers successfully fenced the military
out of a significant role in government after Washington's presidency through polemics against standing armies and dire warnings
of the rise of an American Caesar. Legal argument and judicial decisions became the focus of analysis and reform in the new nation.
Judicial interpretation was pictured as serving the central role of
correcting errors made in the haste of congressional action by
bringing to bear the principles of the ages. John Marshall, Ferguson points out, cited no cases in his greatest constitutional decisions, relying instead on self-evident truths.
25. See, e.g., H. COMMAGER,
26.
WAR

P.

MILLER,

THE

THE EMPmE OF REASON

(1982).

LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL

(1965).
27. R. FERGUSON, supra note 17, at 12-16.
28. Id. at 24-28.
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Lawyers took as their purview the whole of human knowledge,
especially the classics. In an era of generalists, practitioners often
appealed to literature as well as precedent. Underlying this
breadth of interest was the Enlightenment faith that accumulation
of knowledge would lead finally to the kind of unified vision
achieved by Blackstone. Law could be fused with both literature
and ethics to reach an immanent harmony. This view appealed
strongly to intellectuals concerned about the stability of the new
republic. As Ferguson states, "Science, system, and national identity merged in law to form the 'nice links and beautiful dependencies' early republicans needed to create intellectual coherence
within a cultural vacuum. '29 This view of law formed the basis for
the era's "legal aesthetic": "The greatest difficulty for the writer of
the period was to resolve and, failing that, to circumscribe the
[T]he vision of control
unknowns within his experience ....
within eighteenth-century legal thought and the lawyer's faith in
universally applicable forms provided ready answers to a serious
literary problem."3 0
Ferguson uses as the prototypical example of this faith Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia. On the surface, Jefferson's
work appears to be a hodgepodge of geographical facts and social
commentary, but it emerges in Ferguson's discussion as a carefully
designed piece, patterned on the great legal and political treatises
of the age. Law provided the organizing principle for Jefferson's
analysis of the condition and prospects of the new republic. But
one must question, I think, whether Jefferson's conceptualization
of the role of law is sufficient to unify his encyclopedic work
aesthetically.
Lawyers were foremost in framing the Constitution-"visible
proof... of the bond men saw between knowledge, virtue, and the
act of writing. ' 31 But the creation of the Constitution left lawyerwriters with the continuing duty of educating the public through
literary expression. Within the configuration of law and literature,
general education was necessary to the survival of the nation.2"
The lawyer-writer considered the transmission of classical learning
the central civic task of his profession. Classical learning in briefs,
oratory, and judicial opinions as well as in the overtly literary
works of prominent lawyers like Story and Kent remains as evi29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

32.
33.
64.
75-78.
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dence of the lawyer-writer's mission. Literature was valued "for
what it could do rather than for what it was."3 3
The heart of Ferguson's book is its discussion of the effect of
the configuration on the leading lawyer-writers of imaginative literature during the period. The configuration dictated that a lawyerwriter could no more forsake the law than he could ignore the classics. Writing was justified as a service to the nation, and therefore
was expected to advance the unification of the republic by instilling universal values in the populace. Moreover, a lawyer was supposed to be a man of action and could not responsibly forsake the
practice for the contemplation of the study. Paradoxically, one of
the most significant discoveries of Ferguson's study is that the
greatest works of the period were created not by those who forced
their art into the framework dictated by the configuration of law
and literature but by those who rejected that framework. Ferguson
devotes only a chapter to three successful lawyers of the period
who also wrote literature, John Trumbull, Royall Tyler, and Hugh
Brackenridge. In contrast, Ferguson devotes a chapter to each of
the failed lawyers who devoted at least a portion of their lives exclusively to literature, Charles Brockden Brown, William Cullen
Bryant, and Washington Irving. The lawyer-writer's search for
equilibrium between the demands of law and letters, it appears,
did not produce as much literature as it did the vocational anxiety
that accompanied the abandonment of a legal career. The artificial
constraints imposed by the configuration inevitably created tensions in the best literary minds of the age, who were drawn to personal and social concerns denied by the configuration.
The lawyer-writers who bent their art to the requirements of
the configuration had some success in precise descriptions of republican society and in the use of satire. Brackenridge's picaresque
novel Modern Chivalry satirized Jeffersonian democratic ideals
through its descriptions of mob behavior in the countryside. 4 But
the sacrifice in emotional range and the larger demands of their art
were clearly greater. While the configuration of law and literature
allows us to view these forgotten works in a new light and to appreciate the perspective they gave republican society, the new light
does not reveal an unjustly neglected greatness.
In contrast, the lawyer-writers who rejected the law and transformed their sense of guilt and rebellion into poetry and fiction
33. Id. at 84.
34. Id. at 120-28.
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were the most successful authors of the period. Brown's gothic
novels like Wieland convincingly reflect the futility of the law's efforts in the face of the irrational.3 5 Perhaps the most illuminating
discussion in this portion of Ferguson's book is of Irving's History
of New York. When viewed as a "photographic negative" of Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia, 6 Irving's comic masterpiece
reveals its greatness, satirizing the rambling, comprehensive treatises of the day and ridiculing the goal of establishing a just social
order through a regime of law. Although many of Irving's works are
great, his works are greatest when they are most subversive.
By the Civil War, the configuration of law and literature had
collapsed, Ferguson says, for three reasons. First, the rise of legal
specialization eroded the professional dependence of lawyers on
general literature. Specialization placed paramount emphasis on
technical expertise 37 and far less emphasis on political service and
oratorical eloquence. Second, the democratization of the bar by the
influx of lawyers without classical education caused a breakdown of
the professional elites that had dominated the bar in earlier decades.3 8 Third, in line with Jacksonian conceptions, positive law,
particularly in the form of codes, increasingly was seen as a utilitarian device for advancing political policies rather than as an expression of an underlying natural order.3 Correlatively, because
the lawyer was no longer a cultural guardian but the agent for narrow political interests, lawyers were forced to abandon the lofty
principles of the early republic for a series of compromises. When
these compromises failed, particularly in the case of slavery, lawyers bore the opprobrium. "The lawyer's truth," wrote Thoreau,
' 40
"is not truth but consistency or a consistent expediency.
Ferguson uses the career of Daniel Webster to illustrate the
changes in the intellectual climate of the period. No orator has so
commanded the attention and devotion of America; his speeches
both in court and in the political arena were aimed at unifying the
nation under the Constitution by establishing a sympathy between
speaker and audience. Ferguson writes, "He was the lawgiver deliv35. Id. at 138-42.
36. Id. at 154-67.
37. Id. at 199-200, 230-31.
38. Id. at 201-02.
39. E.g., id. at 288-90. Ferguson recognizes the complexities of the relationship between positivist and natural law theories in this period, and does not rest his argument on a
thorough account of them. See id. at 391 n.58.

40. Id. at 238 (quoting HR THOREAU, Civil Disobedience, in 4
DAVID THOREAU

384 (1906)).

THE WRrTINGS OF HENRY
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ering the word to a waiting people, and his first readers inevitably
held that image when they made his published works an absolute
standard. The collected orations gave the best available summary
'
of American purpose."41
Webster's Olympian stature was gradually eroded, however, by
the issue of slavery. The existence of slavery made a mockery of
the assertions by lawyers of the era, including Webster in his earlier years, that a harmony existed between natural and positive
law. Gradually, Webster abandoned the claim to support from
higher law and came to rely on the Constitution as the sole embodiment of law. At the same time, he abandoned the claim to an eternal moral principle and came to rely on compromise as embodying
its own moral principle. At this point the literary and legal imaginations began their radical separation.
The moral outrage of the antislavery movement and the creative impulses of the American Renaissance ran together at mid-century, mixing a
language of prophetic warning with radically private modes of expression.
Out of this combination came a fresh perspective on moral issues, a perspective that regarded the legal mind as a natural enemy.42

Webster, as the embodiment of the configuration of law and literature, was the most inviting target for the new generation of writers,
who valued personal feeling and introspection over political oratory and legal argument.
Changes in the legal profession and its conception of law also
were weakening the links between law and literature. The legal
profession that Richard Henry Dana entered in 1840, just after
publishing his masterpiece Two Years Before the Mast, was moving toward specialization and an instrumental view of law that
gradually would draw him away from literature.' 3 As lawyers began
to abandon natural law, however, Romantic writers claimed it. The
Romantic writers embraced private, prophetic visions and assumed
a dissenting role as lawyers became agents of narrower interests.
Works like Civil Disobedience, The Scarlet Letter, and Moby Dick
held the established order to account against a higher system of
values. The American Renaissance also eroded the period's most
cherished views of the duties of the writer. Whitman's poetry and
the essays of Thoreau and Emerson, though deeply concerned with
defining the nation, exalted the individual's personal search for
truth over a faith in a civic identity. Finally, writers were moving
41. Id. at 213.
42. Id. at 235.
43. Id. at 265.
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toward greater psychological and philosophical complexity. They
rejected falsifying conceptualizations of the nation in favor of
openness to its infinite variety. Their language reflected these
ambiguities.
This new aesthetic of the American Renaissance excludes the legal mind
from literary enterprise. Hawthorne can describe the possibilities in a moonlit
room, and Melville can tell Hawthorne that "truth is ever incoherent," but in
the law reality is always otherwise. Practitioners with clients must deal in
facts, certainty, affirmation, and assurance. They accept complexity and nu-

ance only to solve problems. Reason is their tool; institutional continuity,
their control. Of the emotional vortices and philosophical doubts that under-

mine the professional search for answers, they have little to say. Plays upon
the ambiguous, the unique, and the bizarre-these possibilities excite the
modern writer, and they also run counter to every lawyer's interests and

goals. Since 1850, the best American writers have aimed for an original show
of consciousness. Lawyers have thought ever more consciously of standards,
norms, and rules."

The giants of the configuration of law and literature-Webster, Story, Kent, Marshall, and Adams-viewed the social and political changes around them with despair for the fate of
the union. Their reliance on a republic of stable institutions guided
by elites was inconsistent with the rapid trend toward participatory democracy. At the same time, their very classicism
taught them that change and especially unbridled democracy
would lead the republic toward destruction. Some lawyers, like the
revivalist Charles Finney and the indefatigable reformer David
Dudley Field, maintained an optimistic outlook only by substituting a new universal vision for the configuration of law and
45
literature.
The changes of the era forced intellectuals to choose either the
path of romanticism-turning toward emotion and psychological
complexity-or modern professionalism-turning toward a community of specialized scholars. Lawyer-writers were left without a
role in this new scheme. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the split between law and literature became institutional.
Langdell introduced the case method at the Harvard Law School,
fencing off the study of law from external influences and seeking to
establish law as a science unto itself. Holmes announced his extreme brand of positivism, which repudiated vaguely stated general
principles for precision in the analysis of legal doctrines.
Modern lawyers would enfold themselves and their subjects in expertise.
44. Id. at 271-72.
45. Id. at 273-86.
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The price of their intellectual precision would be a deliberate rejection of
comprehensive ideas and a corresponding loss in communicative power. Legal
knowledge in the twentieth century would reach only the few; it would have
less and less to do with America's general search for self-expression."

Ferguson's description of the rift between law and literature
understandably does not take account of the importance of conceptually oriented academic lawyers in the development of recent
legal thought. In the 1960's scholars began to apply the insights
and techniques of various other disciplines, especially philosophy
and the social sciences, to legal problems. In so doing, these scholars manifested a renewed faith in the interdependence of law and
general knowledge.47 The academic field of law and literature is
very much a part of this trend, although it developed later. By this
circuitous path, literature has begun once again to supply insights
in legal thought, as the works of Weisberg and White demonstrate.
III. WEISBERG: THE MODERN DISFIGURATION
The Failure of the Word examines the work of the giants of
world literature in the period following the collapse of the configuration of law and literature in America. In many ways, The Failure of the Word can be viewed as a companion to Ferguson's Law
and Letters in American Culture because it explores the consequences of the radical separation of law and literature. The critical
approaches taken in these books are remarkably similar. Both
works trace the implications of a concept in the central works of an
entire literary age; Ferguson's treatment of the configuration of law
and literature parallels Weisberg's treatment of ressentiment. Both
ages are defined largely by their relationship to law, but in Weisberg's book the relationship has been transformed radically.
Both works take a historical approach. Just as Ferguson shows
how the vocational anxiety of the major lawyer-writers of his era
defined the central concerns of their art, Weisberg shows how the
experiences of Dostoyevski, Flaubert, Camus, and Melville affected
their artistic interests. More important, both Ferguson and Weisberg demonstrate the political significance of the concepts they examine by highlighting their relationship to the overriding moral
and political concerns of their respective eras. Ferguson repeatedly
demonstrates the centrality of the question of slavery to the fate of
the configuration; Weisberg's starting point is the role of law and
46.
47.

Id. at 290.
R. STEVENs, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE

1980's 272-79 (1983).

1850's

TO THE
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lawyers in the modern totalitarian state. Weisberg begins his work
with a meditation on a short article written by a French lawyer
during the Nazi occupation. The lawyer argued on humanitarian
grounds that the state should have the burden of persuasion that a
person with only two Jewish grandparents was a Jew. 48 This workmanlike effort by an ordinary lawyer-whom Weisberg later compares with Camus' Jean-Baptiste Clamence in The Fallexemplifies the power of complex verbalization to obscure for both
writer and reader the greatest moral crime in history. By this device, Weisberg demonstrates the contemporary jurisprudential importance of the failure of the word.
This recognition of the failure of the word distinguishes the
modern outlook from that of the lawyer-writers of the configuration of law and literature. The fusion of law and letters was based
on a faith in the underlying harmony of natural and positive law
and on the power of writing and oratory to unify the nation in a
common vision. This faith motivated lawyer-writers to frame the
Constitution and later to turn to a legal aesthetic in structuring
the intractable realities of the new nation. Jefferson's writings and
Webster's oratory were the greatest expressions of this classical
tradition. The art of the period dealt with large political themes
designed to create a vision of nationhood. For the modern novelist,
however, literature and the established legal structure are at odds.
The writers of this period do not attack law per se, but assail the
use of language by agents of the state to manipulate law toward
their own ends. They distrust the formal, theoretical approach to
reality as necessarily requiring the sacrifice of sensitivity to the full
complexity of life. Furthermore, the writers more directly distrust
eloquence and verbalization as means by which intelligent but resentful individuals gain power over simpler but more harmonious
ones.
In the modern novel, the lawyer often represents a manipulative verbalizer who conceals his subjective aims in legal forms.
Through the medium of a trial, the lawyer-protagonist distorts reality to achieve dominance over a just but nonverbal individual.
The point is not that lawyers are the only representatives of this
kind of verbalizer. To the contrary, any intellectual, by virtue of
his penchant for complexity, is susceptible to this malaise. But in
the secular era, lawyers-especially prosecutors-are uniquely situ48. R. WEISBERG, supra note 17, at 1-2, 181-82.
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ated to cause harm through their use of language. 49
The writers, as befits modernity, find the source of this destructive impulse in a psychological condition. Nietzsche termed
the condition "ressentiment," the prolonged sense of injury based
on real or imagined insult. Ressentiment causes
the slow poisoning of the intellect. .

.

.Ressentiment, unlike hatred, which

can be resolved in a single decision or gesture is full-blown intellectual malaise, inclined to take institutional and formal, rather than personal and spontaneous, revenge. It emerges only subtly and gradually from an unresolved
sense of insult. The "insult"-real, imagined, or provoked by the desire to
possess an inaccessible object or trait-grates on the intellect as much as on
the emotions. The wounded party may eventually find himself thinking of

little else, even wallowing in an exaggerated sense of injury. Perversely,
though, he elevates the perpetrator of the "insult," who dominates his
thought, to the level of an idol. The rage which should theoretically be directed against this figure he venomously misapplies to innocent third parties.
If unchecked by a major act of will, this process continues to pollute the victim's relationships until his values are overturned utterly. Existential envy
...of the perpetrator, which renders his presence a continuing necessity to
the victim, and organic falsehood . . . , which flows from the vicissitudes in
his personal and intellectual perspective, culminate the insidious process.50

Against this reactive, vindictive model, Nietzsche opposes the
active man who is committed to timeless ethical values and to establishing these values in a system of positive laws. 51 The ressentient individual most often finds that the active man is the source
of his sense of injury, and this discovery provokes the ressentient
individual to form a web of words, which often ends in violence.
For Weisberg, the model of the ressentient protagonist is
Hamlet, who cannot act decisively to resolve injustice, relying instead on his facility with words and leading himself and the innocent around him to destruction.52 In The Failure of the Word,
Weisberg treats Hamlet almost as a myth and repeatedly refers to
the play in virtually every chapter. But, the ressentient protagonist
begins to dominate the field only in the modern novel. Weisberg
discusses at length Dostoyevski's Underground Man, who considers
himself superior to those around him in intellect but who is
poisoned by both his envy for the balanced existence of others and
by his inability to act to resolve perceived insults. Of a former
schoolmate, Dostoyevski's protagonist says, "I hated his handsome
but stupid face (for which I would, however, have gladly exchanged
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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my intelligent one) ...
When the protagonist is (once again)
the object of ridicule at a party, he picks up a bottle intending to
hurl it at his mockers, but instead uses it to fill his glass. 4 The
protagonist acts ultimately only by hurling a verbal assault on an
available innocent party because his contorted mind has substituted the innocent party for his tormentors. The same flaws appear
in the character of Camus' Clamence, the lawyer-protagonist.
Weisberg argues that the ressentient protagonists like those in
Hamlet, Notes from Underground,and The Fall have been interpreted more favorably than their actions deserve because of the
susceptibility of critics to verbal display. 5 For Weisberg, this phenomenon validates the authors' concern with the power of eloquence to convert even intelligent readers to the ressentient side.
Again and again, in the modern novel's treatment of the law,
the lawyer appears as a self-motivated manipulator, twisting the
available evidence to fit a theory of the event rather than remaining open to the event's complexities. This distortion occurs typically in the context of continental criminal procedure, which depends upon the procurator's dramatic narrative of the crime
assembled from the materials gleaned in an inquisitor's investigation. The procurator, Ippolit Kirillovich, in The Brothers
Karamazov, for example, constructs the official theory of theft as
the motivation for Dmitri Karamazov's alleged murder of his father. Kirillovich's vision of the event leads him to dismiss crucial
testimony by Dmitri and to make serious errors of fact, which
culminate in an artistic but deeply distorted narrative depiction of
the crime. The jurors are persuaded, and the innocent Dmitri is
convicted. Similarly, in Camus' Stranger,the inquisitor and procurator jointly create a fundamentally flawed official portrait of the
sensuous and nonverbal defendant Meursault as an antichrist and
a moral monster. One witness sobs, "[T]hey forced me to say the
opposite of what I was thinking. ' 57 Thus, both authors suggest that
"whoever brings ressentiment to the act of formulating life through
words only succeeds in producing an artistically convincing but essentially unjust portrait of reality."5 8
This distortion of reality applies to the novelist's art as well.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Weisberg reveals Dostoyevski's agony at his inability convincingly
to portray his Christian faith in Karamazov, particularly in comparison with the vivid scenes involving the atheist, Ivan
Karamazov. For Weisberg, this tension is inherent in the inadequacy of novelistic form to capture the full spontaneity of life. The
author's guiding ideals-Dostoyevski's, religious experience and
Flaubert's classical heroism-suffer vis-a-vis the rancorous verbalizers. Thus, the modern novel's criticism of mendacious verbal
structures of the lawyer betrays a strand of self-criticism as well.
Perhaps the most striking treatment of these themes in the
modern novel is Melville's Billy Budd, Sailor, to which Weisberg
devotes the last two chapters of his work. Because Melville's novella links the works of Ferguson and Weisberg, it is useful to examine Weisberg's treatment of the novella.
In Billy Budd, the simple and handsome Billy impetuously, if
not involuntarily, strikes the villainous Claggart dead because
Claggart falsely accuses Billy of mutiny, and Billy is unable to respond because of a stutter. Captain Vere, while recognizing the injustice, convenes a kangaroo court and makes tendentious arguments that virtually order the court to condemn Billy to death. Yet
Captain Vere, the embodiment of the ressentient protagonist, has
been viewed by many critics as nobly struggling with an impossible
choice forced upon him in time of war. In a brief discussion of the
novella at the end of his work, Ferguson writes that
"[u]nmistakably, it is precision of language, an excluding logic, insistence upon context, and an overruling distrust of moral philosophy-traits of the modern professional-that kill Billy Budd."5 9 In
a similar vein, Merlin Bowen states that Billy Budd is "a study in
the possible consequences of a commitment to a fixed and theoretic pattern rather than to patternless life itself with all its con60
tradictions, crosscurrents, and inescapable risks.
The novella attacks the theoretical approach to reality that
would exclude concerns arising from the unique circumstances of
the cases. But Weisberg argues that Billy's death is not the result
of Vere's inability to look beyond the letter of the law, as Vere
himself would have it, but upon his willingness to misrepresent the
terms of the law to reach a desired end. Weisberg shows, as a matter of legal history, that the applicable law in no way required
59. R.
60. R.

FERGUSON,
WEISBERG,

217-18 (1960)).

supra note 17, at 289.
supra note 17, at 144 (quoting M.
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Vere's action; indeed, Vere violated eight established procedural
safeguards in the Articles of War, including failing to regain the
fleet, inappropriately invoking summary procedures, acting in secret, and executing a capital sentence without review.6 1 This part
of Weisberg's argument seems less than convincing because it depends on evidence outside the novella, and Melville could not have
assumed that his audience had such a sophisticated knowledge of
the law. Weisberg demonstrates, however, that there was ample
latitude in the applicable law, even as Melville describes it, to mitigate the sentence.6 2 Certainly, there was no need to force an execution to placate the crew, as Vere argued, because the crew would
have approved fully a regular procedure that saved the life of their
hero.
Beyond Vere's formalistic turn of mind, what explains this calculated action of the captain against Billy, whom he clearly admires? Weisberg argues in his final chapter that the cause is ressentiment provoked by an unconscious association of Billy with
Admiral Nelson, who typifies the "handsome sailor" whom Vere
envies. Billy, a simple, honest actor rather than a covert dissembler, becomes a surrogate for Vere's frustration and self-contempt
when Vere compares himself to Nelson.
Weisberg shows that Melville does not simply criticize the rise
of modern professionalism or the inability of judges to mitigate the
strict letter of the law. Melville's subject is the susceptibility of the
law to the individual who uses obfuscating verbal structures to
thwart the operation of justice. The self-critical element in this
theme is particularly pronounced here. Weisberg quotes a remarkable passage from Billy Budd, in which Nelson sits down to write
his will just before Trafalgar. For Melville, Nelson's actions represent the magnificent possibility of a fusion of art and just action. As Weisberg observes, "Only ressentient modern-day verbalizers see alienation from heroic activities as a sine qua non for the
verbally expressive life."163 The classical epic, for Melville, was the
literary equivalent of Nelson's act, uncritically praising heroism.
"One arm acted, the other wrote. The match of outer form with
inner man achieved artistic harmony in such figures.

concludes his work with the following paragraph:
61.

Id. at 145-53.

62. Id. at 153-59.
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Melville grasped a truth we may pursue-that modern novelistic complexity results in an overly reactive and negative series of private formulations. Although his self-awareness is insufficient to repel the influence of the
declining culture in which he is steeped, it enables him to call for a renewal of
the old alliance of artistry with just action. For Whatever has furthered the
preoccupation of the narrative mode with ressentiment can yet be altered.
Social institutions wax and wane, and romanticisms of various sorts yield
eventually to the ebullient creativity of self-willed people with a firm sense of
communal ethics. Literary art, ever the reflection of a culture's sense of itself,
may again join with a positive system of law to generate admirable
language.6 5

Weisberg ends with the aspiration that motivated Ferguson's
study of the configuration of law and literature: to recapture the
harmony of art and polity that was the most positive element of
the configuration. In the era of the configuration of law and literature, the ideal of the lawyer-writer was to fuse his professional action in public service with writing that served the larger goals of
nationhood. Modern authors retained a public commitment but
from a point of view of criticism from the outside. Their writing
probed psychological complexities, often in the context of an unjust social order. Yet as Weisberg demonstrates, the author's status
as an outsider has dangers as well. As much as the intellectual may
criticize the corruption of government, his social vision must always implicitly condemn purely verbal activities; the ideal remains
the man of action, often portrayed as nonverbal. For Weisberg,
writing in the modern -age is inherently suspect, because it attempts to reduce reality to a narrative that is deceptive and selfserving. The isolation of modern writers from the turbulence of life
is a source of anguish to them even now. 66 As Weisberg's treatment
of Melville shows, however, the writers held out the hope for a life
that would combine writing with just action.
IV.

WHITE: A NEW CONFIGURATION

While Ferguson's work is one of literary and intellectual history and Weisberg's is one of comparative literary criticism,
White's When Words Lose Their Meaning is unashamedly didactic. Although White deals with works of literature and politics, as
does Ferguson, White's purpose is not to identify or elaborate a
quality of a particular culture. And although he pursues common
themes across a range of texts from diverse cultures, as does Weisberg, White's most direct aim is not to show the identity of these
65.
66.

Id. at 175-76.
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concerns but to teach a "way of reading" that has extraordinary
depth, subtlety, and significance. For White, reading in this way
implies a concept of the nature of language, the self, and the relations between the self and others, not only in personal friendships
but at the level of legal and political discourse. Reading is not
solely the acquisition of knowledge but an ethical process in which
one's character is formed. As a result, White's work often resembles a highly sophisticated self-help manual. White describes the
book as being "at its heart a report of my own search for such an
6' 7
education" that is "directed to a reader similarly engaged.
White's texts suggest the generality of his concerns: Homer's
Iliad,Thucydides' History of the PeloponnesianWar, Plato's Gorgias, Swift's Tale of a Tub, Johnson's Rambler essays, Austen's
Emma, Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, and the
basic constitutional documents of early America. White's treatment of these works is very difficult to summarize because so many
of his insights emerge only in the context of the readings. The
readings of these disparate works, conventionally assigned to literature, philosophy, and law, are unified only at the most conceptual
level. White attempts to show that each author treats the "cultural
and ethical activity of making meaning in relation to others."6
The arrangement of the texts also is crucial; White progresses from
works concerning "the community of two," or personal friendship,
to those addressing the political community. Moreover, the authors
themselves devise progressively more complex ways of making
meaning in relation to others-from the depiction of the utter collapse of meaning in Thucydides to the sophisticated definition of
conversational roles in the American Constitution.
The central difficulty that White addresses in his analysis of
these texts is the fluidity of the self and its surrounding culture
because of the peculiar nature of language.6 9 As White says,
"[W]henever we speak or write we define ourselves and another
and a relation between us, and we do so in words that are necessarily made by others and modified by our use of them. '7 0 Both parts
of this assertion are crucial to White: first, that language is central
to the formation of individual character and human relationships
and, second, that language is in part inherited and in part depen67.
68.
69.
70.

J. WHrrE, supra note 17, at 287.
Id. at 275.
Id. at x.
Id. at 276.
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dent upon our use of it."' White captures this fluidity dramatically
in his theme that words can lose their meaning. Thucydides says,
for example, that in the Peloponnesian War, "[ilrrational boldness
was considered as manly loyalty to one's partisans; prudent delay
as specious cowardice, moderation as a disguise for unmanliness,
and a well-rounded intelligence as a disqualification for action.""2
Yet this "uncertain reciprocity" between the speaker and his language does not inevitably foreclose the discovery of meaning; it
dictates that this discovery must be made through an organic process of "reconstitution of language and community. '7' This process
cannot be purely conceptual; it must emerge through a variety of
complex literary processes.
At the heart of this activity is an exalted view of the written
text and a highly complex view of reading. White believes that
the written "text" has a unique place in the history of culture, for it reduces
to permanence a process that is otherwise ephemeral and renders public,
through the multiplication of readings, what is in the first instance essentially
private. Unlike any other conversation, it has an unlimited number of anonymous but necessarily individual partners, located in an unlimited set of cultural contexts. It offers its reader an experience of cultural reconstitution
that can be repeated in the imagination at any place and time. In this sense it
is a part of the culture that transcends its own immediate location in space,
time, and social context . .. .

To read such a text, one must "engage" it by participating in
its world and by constructing a response to it. Lawyers will recognize this kind of reading as drawn from the searching case analysis
taught in the first year of law school;75 literary critics will see it as
a form of "reader response" criticism.7 6 By imaginatively placing
himself in the culture of which the author is a part, the reader
familiarizes himself with the language that the author has inherited. The reader sees how the author makes use of his resources
and addresses his limitations by paying special attention to the
"key words" of that culture, those that define its values. The
reader must also attend to what White calls the "social and literary
forms" in which language operates within the culture. These diverse forms include Socrates' distinction between rhetoric and dialectic in the Gorgias;the culture of argument in the American legal
71.
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system and the very different culture in Thucydides' world, in
which cities are represented in debate as individuals; and the difference between language addressed merely to the intellect and
"poetic language" that is addressed to the whole person.77
In this process of cultural reconstitution, a community is established between author and reader through the medium of the
text. By identifying the "ideal reader" of the text 78 -the author's
conception of what he would like his reader to become-the actual
or "central" reader79 can question the language of the author
against the reader's experience. The reader participates in the relations among individuals and the relations between individuals and
their culture, and in the process, the reader sees how these relations are determined by language within the text. For White, this
textual community is a species of friendship 0 typified in its positive form by the sense of personal intimacy with the author that
the reader derives from the novels of Jane Austen, and typified in
its negative form by the sense of shame one feels in laughing at a
racist joke. As these examples show, the ideal reader is a construct,
whom we may choose to become or repudiate in the dialectic of
reading.
These examples suggest the variety of ways that a text can
engage the reader. White makes clear that, for him, the best texts
always recognize the autonomy and wholeness of the reader and
educate him through the literary process of distinction, complication, and refutation. From the sense of character and relation that
emerges gradually from the textual community, White asserts, we
most confidently can make ethical judgments about the text and
about the culture that produced it. White's aim is to illustrate this
ineffable process of formulating critical judgments, of which literary, philosophical, and legal criticism are species. White necessarily
challenges as incomplete-or inadequate to his purposes-the
techniques of science and economics, which maintain sharp distinctions among facts, values, and the process of reasoning.
Indeed, in White's view, the act of writing and reading is inherently ethical, "for it always entails the definition of at least two
roles (writer and reader) and the establishment of a relationship
between them that can be seen to have both political and ethical
77. Id. at 279-80.
78. Id. at 15.
79. Id. at 17 n.*.
80. Id. at 289. White ascribes this analogy to Wayne Booth who developes the analogy
in The Way I Loved George Eliot, 2 KENYON REv. (n.s.) No. 2 at 4 (1980).
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content." 8 White means more by this observation than that writing and reading must have some ethical implications. As one of his
epigraphs, he quotes Sartre's statement that "[ilt would be inconceivable that this unleashing of generosity provoked by the writer
could be used to authorize an injustice, and that the reader could
enjoy his freedom while reading a work which approves or accepts
or simply abstains from condemning the subjection of man by
man. "82 While one certainly must question this generalization, it is
true that the works White discusses are ethical because their very
subjects are social relationships ranging from the purely personal
to the most broadly political.
White finds a linkage between the personal friendships enacted in the texts and the larger political relationships, quoting Aristotle's claim that justice and friendship are concerned with fundamentally the same ideals. White shows that the culture of
argument depicted in Thucydides' History collapsed because of the
Athenians' single-minded commitment (most strikingly in the Melian debates) to the norm of self-interest, to the exclusion of a notion of justice that would give the self meaning.83 By extension, an
ideal political community would be a world of friendship among
equals, in which autonomous speakers reconstitute their culture
from the available materials by structured conversation. A just legal system likewise is based on proper relations between the court
and the body of law and among the actors in the case.
White makes clear by his arrangement of materials that the
closest any political community has come to this ideal was in the
collective drafting of the American Constitution during the eighteenth century, and the closest any legal system has come to the
ideal is in the American system's culture of argument. White emphasizes the dependence of the Constitution's dictates on the collective assent of the people to self-regulation. The Constitution's
function is not to create power but to establish a language and a
set of roles and occasions for speaking, which, with the participation of the people, create a government.8 4 The speakers that fill
those roles are the ideal readers of the document. To support this
view of the Constitution, White refers to the obscure clauses re81.

J. WHTE,supra note
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Frechtman trans. 1965).
83. J. WHITE, supra note 17, at 91.
84. Id. at 244-47.
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quiring each House of Congress to keep a journal 85 and empowering the President to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices." 86 These provisions, trivial in themselves, suggest a larger purpose of the framers
to create a continuing discourse within government.
White, like Ferguson, focuses on the role of the courts in the
constitutional scheme. White sees in the case or controversy requirement the defining characteristic of the courts and the reason
why the courts have played the greatest role in developing the
meaning of the Constitution. By examining McCulloch v. Maryland, again from a rhetorical perspective, he shows how Marshall
casts the court in the role of arbiter in the great intergovernmental
clashes over the meaning of the Constitution. Although Marshall
canvasses the experience of the nation on* the question of the
power to create a national bank, only through Marshall's opinion
does that experience become crystalized as the ground for decision. 7 By reconstituting the developing national consensus, the
court distills the wishes of "the People," the original but dispersed
source of the Constitution's power.
These observations lead White to a discussion of the judicial
opinion as a part of "a continuing and collective process of conversation and judgment.""8 The court only decides after formal argument; the opinion that emerges becomes the basis for future argument. In the process, the court establishes connections with the
past and future, and acknowledges the need for both stability and
change. While Weisberg finds the process of narrative in the continental legal system to be the source of profound distortion, White
believes the American adversary system creates a culture of
argument:
It is a way of making a world with a life and a value of its own. The conversation that it creates is at once its method and its point, and its object is to give
to the world it creates the kind of intelligibility that results from the simultaneous recognition of contrasting positions. This recognition is necessary to
the rational definition and pursuit even of the most selfish ends. Without it,
neither reason nor ambition can have form or meaning.89

One of the critical features of the collapse of the configuration
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
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of law and literature was the specialization of the law with the accompanying movement away from the talk of universal principles
that made recourse to classical literature in legal argument so common. White does not bemoan the segregation of legal from literary
discourse because his view of reading reintegrates the legal enterprise with the process of cultural definition. The reader of the legal
text reads in his culture as a way of criticizing the text. "The lawyer's work thus contributes to a process of collective or cultural
education that is in structure analogous to that experienced by the
single reader of a literary text." 90 While no individual's reading is
authoritative, each individual's criticism becomes part of the ongoing process of argument that provides for continuity as well as
change.
White's description of the process of reconstitution of culture
is strongly reminiscent of the vision of the lawyer-writers of the
early republic. Compare Tocqueville's statement that the American
Constitution exists "only in the mind" with White's assertion that
"writing is always a kind of social action: a proposed engagement
of one mind with another."9' 1 Jane Austen's readers become more
ethical by the enactment of the relations in the text (in White's
view) in much the same way that the lawyer-writers hoped that the
Constitution and the works and oratory that expounded it would
create the ideal citizen. This parallel raises the suspicion that
White's view is bound to his choice of works, which are largely
from the same era that Ferguson treats. White demonstrates his
position only through the study of carefully selected classical and
' 92
neoclassical works; what he terms the "literature of friendship.
Is White's view hopelessly idealistic in an age of the literature of
alienation, which Weisberg so convincingly treats? Weisberg's suggestion that intellectuals are susceptible to ressentiment seems inconsistent with White's faith in the ethical power of the text. Does
White's discussion of the "possibilities of American law" have
meaning in an age of more mundane realities?
It certainly would be wrong to dismiss White's approach on
these grounds. White does not advocate an uncritical acceptance of
the ethical views of any author. By choosing to demonstrate his
way of reading with works whose ideal readers he finds most appealing according to his ethical norms, White illustrates how char90. Id. at 272.
91. Id. at 15.
92. Id. at 220.
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acter might be formed in the act of reading; he does not deny the
need to repudiate other ideal readers.
However, we still are not thoroughly comforted by White's
demonstration of the constitutive possibilities of the text. The reason lies, to some extent, in White's critical style, which eschews the
social and historical research of a critic like Ferguson as well as the
psychological emphasis of Weisberg. As a result, White's approach
seems curiously abstract. This quality of White's work is related to
his failure to address the problem, so basic to both Ferguson and
Weisberg, of the relationship between language and just action.
White rarely admits a distinction between writing and life itself
because in his view of writing and reading, the actor's entire being
is engaged. Indeed, White explicitly equates culture or a society's
values with its language; he states that "[iun a sense we literally are
the language that we speak. '93 He insists, however, that he is not
reducing all problems to ones of language. He states that "[t]he
world of language mediates between the languageless within and
the languageless without."9 ' White's view assumes that the nonverbal individual cannot be just or harmonious. For him the creation
of a text is the most important constitutive act an individual can
make. After Weisberg's demonstration of the inadequacies and destructive possibilities of complex verbalization, however, we must
question whether White's optimism is justified.
V.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF LAW AND LITERATURE

The modern field of law and literature is, paradoxically, a
product of the breakdown of the configuration of law and literature. When law and literature were considered coordinate disciplines, united by their consonance with universal principles, and
when lawyers considered writing an adjunct to their larger patriotic commitment, by definition there was no need for an interdisciplinary field of study. With the collapse of the configuration, lawyers and writers were no longer lawyer-writers but different
individuals with radically different philosophical, aesthetic, and
political outlooks. Lawyers began to view the skills essential to
their occupation as analytical and practical, a science unto themselves that excluded general literary and philosophical concerns.
Law became viewed as an instrument of politics, and law study
turned exclusively to the documents of the law itself. Writers, in
93.
94.
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contrast, turned their attention to psychological complexities; they
retained a political concern but focused on the plight of the individual in opposition to the existing order, an order that often conflicted with the writers' ethical sense. We are deeply indebted to
Ferguson for his exhaustive social and intellectual history of the
rise and fall of the configuration, as well as for his enrichment of
the canon of American literature.
As the rift widened, it became apparent to some lawyers that
the scientific turn in law study had gone too far. The first configuration was based in part on meaningless generalities and obfuscating fictions and was linked to an aristocratic professional and social structure. Nonetheless, lawyers began to feel that the
dissolution of the link with literature had sacrificed much that was
valuable. Not only had the abandonment of classical rhetoric impoverished the persuasive resources of the lawyer, but all of literature was lost as a source of knowledge of human character and the
operation of the law. The study of law and literature then arose as
a means of mediating between the separate domains. At first urged
as a pursuit ancillary to law practice,9 5 the field required only the
influx of legal scholars with professional training in literary criticism to complete the formation of a new academic discipline.
While the early work in the field lacked rigor, it perceived, in a
general way, the shortcomings of the law's methodological focus
and the potential for interdisciplinary study.
Of course, legal subjects like jurisprudence and professional
responsibility also deal with topics like the nature of law, the relationship of law and morality, and the duty to obey the law. But
literature makes these issues concrete by developing a narrative
that may be more illuminating than abstract discussion. These
value-laden questions resist theoretical discussion and often can be
addressed most effectively through a literary process.
This view of the field's origins explains its insistent concerns
with criticism of "legal novels," with the problems of language and
interpretation, and with values. All of these concerns were encompassed by the study of law itself in the era of the configuration;
now that these concerns are excluded by the mainstream of modern law study, law and literature makes possible serious discussion
of them within the law school community. Weisberg's work is one
of the finest expressions of this enterprise. It unites the traditional
95. See, e.g., Hitchler, The Reading of Lawyers, 33 DICm L. REv. 1 (1928); Wigmore,
supra note 1.
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criticism of novels on explicitly legal subjects with an ethical perspective related to the problems in the use of language. Few works
have so completely reflected the most basic concerns of the field.
White's work is unique in that it does not address legal novels, but
only works of general literature and purely legal documents. Yet
White's work is undeniably a part of law and literature because it
advances a way of reading that not only draws on the analytical
strengths of both disciplines but implies an ethical and political
vision that unites the disciplines, at least in an ideal sense. It may
be viewed as an attempt to construct a new configuration of law
and literature, based not on a mystical unity of positive and natural law but on a political and legal system of equal speakers.
These three works are the best expressions of the developing
field of law and literature. Their critical styles provide useful contrasting models for future work. Most important, their insights
into the problems and possibilities of language and its relationship
to ethical action will define the scope of the field for years to come.

